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Case No. 20000854-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (2000); 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37A-5(l) (2000); and possession of an alcoholic beverage in an open container 
while inside a motor vehicle, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
41-5-44.20 (2000), in the Third Judicial District Court of Toole County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable David S. Young, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(1999). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court commit plain error by not sua sponte suppressing 
evidence obtained through the vehicle search? 
Standard of Review: To establish plain error, defendant must demonstrate that 
"(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the 
error is harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
Issue No. 2: Was defense counsel ineffective for not filing pre-trial and post-trial 
motions? 
Standard of Review: "Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims present a mixed 
question of law and fact" Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah) (citing Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984), and State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 
1990)), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994). An appellate court reviews questions of law 
for correctness, but defers to the trial court's findings of fact. See State v. Lav ell, 1999 
UT 40,1J22, 984 P.2d 382. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV; 
2 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or 
may, without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of 
any peace officer; "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any 
device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, 
or records the observations of any of the physical senses; 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with possession of a controlled substance, a 
second degree felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor; and 
possession of an alcoholic beverage in an open container while inside a motor vehicle, a 
class C misdemeanor. R. 1-2. 
At trial, following the close of the State's evidence, defendant made an oral motion 
to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his vehicle. R. 126:122-23. The court 
took the matter under advisement. R. 126:142. After the jury found defendant guilty on 
all counts, the court denied defendant's motion to suppress as untimely under rule 12, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. R. 126:206-09. However, the court then invited 
defendant to file a motion for new trial, noting that it would reconsider the issues 
surrounding defendant's motion to suppress at that time. R. 126:209. 
The court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison term of one to fifteen 
years for possession of a controlled substance. R. 113-15. Defendant was also ordered to 
serve concurrent jail sentences of six months for possession of drug paraphernalia, and 
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ninety days for possession of an open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle. Id. 
Defendant timely appealed his convictions. R. 116-17. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On the morning of March 14, 2000, Officer Roger Niesporek, Jr. received a radio 
call from dispatch, reporting two people sitting in a car drinking alcohol in front of an 
apartment complex. R. 126:64-66. Consistent with dispatch's description, shortly after 
8:00 a.m. Officer Niesporek located a green Pontiac parked parallel to the sidewalk in 
front of the Landmark Apartments. R. 126:66-67. Officer Niesporek parked his patrol 
car directly behind the vehicle. R. 126:67. Upon approaching the driver's side of the 
vehicle, Officer Niesporek observed a can of beer just outside the driver's door. R. 
126:67-68. The can was tipped over and its contents were in a puddle around the can. Id. 
Defendant was seated in the driver's seat next to a female who occupied the front 
passenger seat. R. 126:68-69. Officer Niesporek's onboard video camera recorded a 
majority of the encounter. R. 126:67.2 
After requesting defendant's identification, Officer Niesporek asked defendant if 
he had any other alcoholic beverages in the car. Id. Defendant pointed to the can on the 
lThe facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. 
Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, f2, 989 P.2d 1091. 
2The camera did not automatically turn on when Officer Niesporek first arrived at 
the scene. R. 126:67. Consequently, the camera began recording after Officer Niesporek 
noticed that it was off and requested that Officer Morgan turn the camera on. Id. The 
recording begins before the field sobriety tests were conducted and ends after defendant 
was placed in jail. R. 126:67, 74, 76-77, 80-83, 85. 
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ground outside his door, indicated that he had only one can, and handed the officer an 
unopened can of beer. R. 126:69. As Officer Niesporek initiated his contact with 
defendant, Officer Jeff Morgan arrived as backup help. R. 126:69, 115-16. Officer 
Morgan went to the passenger window and observed another open can of beer between 
the passenger seat and door. R. 126:69-70, 116. Upon Officer Niesporek's request, the 
passenger handed him the opened can next to her seat. R. 126:69-70. Later at trial, 
defendant admitted that he was holding an open beer can "in between [his] lap" and that 
he set that can outside his car door as the officer approached. R. 126:144, 151. Defendant 
also admitted that another open beer can was located on the passenger side of the vehicle, 
'towards the floorboard." R. 126:144-45. 
Officer Niesporek next asked defendant to exit the vehicle for the purpose of 
conducting field sobriety tests. R. 126:70. Defendant's passenger was also asked to exit 
the vehicle. R. 126:71-72. Several sobriety tests were performed on the sidewalk near 
the backside of defendant's vehicle. R. 126:70. The tests confirmed that defendant was 
only slightly impaired and not intoxicated beyond the legal driving limit. R. 126:70-71. 
At that point, Officer Niesporek had not determined whether to issue defendant a citation 
or to place him under arrest. R. 126:90. 
The search. Officer Niesporek did a quick pat down search of defendant to look 
for weapons. R. 126:71,92. The pat down search revealed only a coin purse. R. 126:92-
93. Then both officers searched defendant's vehicle, checking for additional open 
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containers of alcohol or any other evidence. R. 126:71,90, 116-17. During the search, 
defendant stood on the parallel sidewalk adjacent to his vehicle. R. 126:70, 145-47. At 
trial, Officer Morgan testified of his belief that the officers had been given consent to 
search defendant's vehicle. R. 126:117. However, defendant and Officer Niesporek 
testified that no consent to search had been given. R. 126:117-20, 128, 146, 160.3 
While searching defendant's vehicle, Officer Morgan discovered a purple 
marijuana pipe underneath a napkin in the slot on the lower half of the driver's door. R. 
126:72, 91-92, 116-18. Simultaneous to Officer Morgan's discovery, Officer Niesporek 
found drug rolling papers commonly known as "zigzags" and the outer casing of a pen in 
a black backpack located in front of the passenger seat. R. 126:72-73,90-91, 118. Based 
upon his training and experience, Officer Niesporek recognized that pen casings are 
commonly used as straws to snort controlled substances, and "zigzags" are commonly 
used to smoke marijuana. R. 126:72-73, 90-92. Immediately upon finding the drug 
paraphernalia, Officer Niesporek took defendant into custody, handcuffing his hands. R. 
126:73-74, 93. Defendant was arrested for possession of an open container of alcohol in 
3Although on cross examination defense counsel did not question Officer Morgan 
further about the consent issue, testimony offered by Officer Niesporek and defendant 
indicated that Officer Morgan's belief was in error. R. 126:117-20, 128, 146, 160. Also, 
in a conversation outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor maintained that Officer 
Morgan was mistaken and that he was not asserting that the officers had received consent 
to search defendant's vehicle. R. 126:128. Alternatively, at trial the State asserted that, 
consistent with the officers' testimony, the search was done for the purpose of finding 
other open containers of alcohol. Id. 
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a motor vehicle and for possession of drug paraphernalia. R. 126:74; Onboard Video 
Recording at 8:32.4 
Discarding the drugs. As a matter of common practice, prior to placing 
defendant in the patrol car Officer Niesporek did a quick search of his patrol vehicle. R. 
126:74, 93-95, 100. The officer searched around, under, on top, and between the 
cushions of the front passenger seat to ensure that his car was clean and no incriminating 
evidence was hidden there. Id. Then he secured defendant in the passenger seat, turned 
his onboard video camera around to face defendant, and left to conduct an inventory 
search of defendant's vehicle. R. 126:74-76. The inventory search and impound lasted 
between ten and fifteen minutes. R. 126:76. 
While seated in the police car, defendant used his head to turn the video camera 
away. R. 126:87-88; Onboard Video Recording at 8:34. Then, with a great deal of 
movement, defendant discarded two small concealed bags of methamphetamine between 
the seat cushions of the passenger seat, pushing them through the seat and onto the floor 
of the police car behind his seat. R. 126:78-79, 88, 97-100. The video camera recorded 
defendant's movements. R. 126:88; Onboard Video Recording at 8:34.5 After discarding 
4This Court granted the State's motion to supplement the record with the 
accompanying copy of Officer Neisporek's onboard video recording of this event. See 
Order dated 11 June 2001. Accordingly, citation herein to that video recording reflects 
the time as indicated on the recording. 
defendant later claimed that his movements in the patrol car were mere attempts 
to adjust the handcuffs. R. 126:147-55. As defendant was handcuffed and secured in the 
car, he complained that the handcuffs were too tight. R. 126:87. However, Officer 
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the drugs, defendant again used his head to turn the video camera back toward him. Id. 
After completing the inventory search and impound of defendant's vehicle, Officer 
Niesporek transported defendant to jail R. 126:76-77. Arriving at the jail, the officer 
entered and parked his car in the large secure garage commonly known as the sallyport. 
R. 126:77. When the automatic doors closed behind his vehicle, Officer Niesporek 
locked his vehicle and escorted defendant into the jail. R. 126:77-78. As the officer was 
about to leave the sallyport, he noticed two small, clear bags containing 
methamphetamine behind the passenger seat on the floor of his car. R. 126:78-79. He 
then placed the bags into evidence and informed defendant that he was amending his prior 
charge to include possession of the drugs. R. 126:80. 
At trial, Officer Niesporek testified that no one else had been in his vehicle on the 
day of the encounter, nor on the previous day, and no one had access to his vehicle while 
it was in the sallyport. R. 126:77-78, 98-99. 
Niesporek testified that he had properly placed the handcuffs on defendant v/ith the palms 
of defendant's hands facing in and his arms behind his back, and then checked them for 
fit. R. 126:73-75, 86-88, 158-59. Consistent with the officer's testimony, defendant 
shows no facial signs of pain when he was seated inside the patrol car. Onboard Video 
Recording at 8:34. Then, before the officer transported defendant to the jail, defendant 
complained that his hands were numbing. R. 126:87. At that point, Officer Niesporek 
noticed that while defendant was seated in the patrol car, he had twisted his hands and 
arms around in the handcuffs. R. 126:87. The officer loosened the handcuffs, 
repositioned defendant's hands, and secured them. R. 126:88. Defendant's discomfort 
likely resulted from his movements while discarding the drugs. 
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ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
POINT I: On appeal defendant asserts that the trial court committed plain error in 
denying defendant's oral motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his 
vehicle. This claim fails, however, because it is inadequately briefed. Defendant only 
cursorily mentions his plain error argument once—at the close of his statement of facts. 
Because defendant fails to state the relevant standard and provide meaningful analysis, 
this Court should decline to consider his argument on appeal. 
Notwithstanding the procedural inadequacies of defendant's claim, because the 
search of his vehicle was a lawful search incident to his arrest, defendant's claim also 
fails on the merits. The record reveals that when the search occurred the officers had 
probable cause to arrest defendant for possession of an open container of alcohol in a 
motor vehicle, the vehicle search was performed contemporaneously to defendant's 
arrest, and the area searched was within defendant's immediate control. Accordingly, the 
officer's conduct was well within the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 
Defendant also claims that the officers exceeded the scope of their search for open 
containers of alcohol, and therefore, the drug paraphernalia evidence obtained in the 
search should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Defendant's claim fails, 
however, because the officers were acting within the search incident to arrest doctrine. 
Therefore, they were lawfully entitled to search all bags and compartments within the 
passenger compartment of defendant's car. 
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POINT II: Defendant next claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
of counsel for not filing a motion to suppress prior to trial, and alternatively, for not filing 
a motion for new trial upon the court's invitation. Defendant's claim fails, however, 
because, as demonstrated in Point I, the officers' conduct was a lawful search incident to 
arrest. Therefore, any motions objecting to evidence obtained during that search would 
have been futile if raised. 
ARGUMENT 
On appeal, defendant challenges only his convictions for possession of a controlled 
substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. See Br. of Aplt. at 8-10. Defendant does 
not challenge his conviction for possession of an open container of alcohol in a motor 
vehicle. See id. Indeed, at trial he openly admitted his guilt. See R. 126:143-45. 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S PLAIN ERROR CLAIM FAILS 
BECAUSE IT IS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED; 
NOTWITHSTANDING THESE PROCEDURAL 
INADEQUACIES, DEFENDANT'S CLAIM FOR 
SUPPRESSION OF THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN 
THE SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE ALSO FAILS ON 
THE MERITS BECAUSE THE SEARCH OF 
DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS INCIDENT TO HIS 
LAWFUL ARREST 
Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error by not sua sponte 
suppressing the drug paraphernalia evidence obtained from the search of his. Br. of Aplt. 
at 7. Additionally, defendant suggests that the trial court should have likewise suppressed 
10 
the drugs found in the officer's vehicle followmg the search as fruit of the poisonous tree. 
I1 ! n l A p i ! Jill ' 
bi ief his plain error claim pursuant to rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Pi ocedure. 
Second, defendant's suppression claim fails on the1 merits because the officers' search of 
defendant i illiii lib i nasi limit tl A \AW llliill ILMKII IIII ult iill I iiiiiiir.L 
\m Defendant fails to adequnteh brief Ms assei tion of plain en 01 
rule 24 of the Utah I ^ of Appellate Procedure, the argument section 
of an appcaa;,; , ~; ^: , u * lain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respei * *u ~ prr~f' ~ -! -nrludinp l' -rounds f' 
preserved in llie iiial luurt, with L _ to the authorities, statutes, and parts of'the 
record relied on " ! Itah R App. P. 24(a)(9). The Utah Supreme Court has consistently 
I I l l l l l . l t i » - C ! 
authority cited," State v. vunop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 tjJtah 1988) uiuuoiia onu quumuuiis 
omitted), and "[an appellate court] is not a depository' in which the appealing party may 
di imp the bui den of argument and researin. **n*: ..*... <;• 
will decline w ^on . ;en? itia; a party has failec 
i uuOiu^ 1^ 9v ^ i _,f 1 i. / 4 i _u ~v > ititation^ duu .aviations omit.^ 
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the close of his statement of facts. See Br. of Aplt. at 7. It is well established that to show 
plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that "(0 [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should 
have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." See Dunn, 850 P.2d 
at 1208. Defendant's brief wholly lacks a statement of that standard and any meaningful 
analysis. See Br. of Aplt. at 8-10. Defendant also fails to offer any analysis supporting 
his one-sentence assertion that evidence found in defendant's vehicle should be 
suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Br. of Aplt. at 10. For those reasons, this 
Court should decline to consider defendant's argument. See Thomas, 1999 UT 2 at f 11 
(an appellate court will not consider an inadequately briefed argument). 
B. On the merits, defendant's claim fails because the officers9 search of 
defendant's vehicle constituted a lawful search incident to arrest 
Notwithstanding the deficiencies of defendant's plain error claim, because the 
record reveals that the search of defendant's vehicle was a lawful search incident to 
arrest, defendant's claim also fails on the merits. 
Although the doctrine of a search incident to arrest was not clearly asserted by the 
State in rebuttal to defendant's oral motion to suppress, "this [Cjourt may affirm the trial 
court's decision on any proper ground." State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 n.l (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996) cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (1996). "To do so, the legal ground must be 
'apparent on the record' and sufficiently briefed by the appellee." State v. Chevre, 2000 
UT App 6, H12, 994 P.2d 1278 (quoting State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 149-50 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). 
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On appeal, defendant argues that the officers' actions do not fit within the doctrine 
ol a -.can ii in i"".li'"iil' in am".I Ui nl , .1 It. at '"'Jl I ,.(ia il'ii .111 \, defendant claims that the 
officers' search was improper beciihi1 if the tinir i ilir -c IIII IIII n i 11 i IIIHILM .UJTSL 
See Br. of Apl t at 9-10. Additionally, < v~~*w «^ w v/mceis' motives for 
conducting the search. 1 'd In particular, defendant points to Officer Niesporek's 
issue a citation, his statement 'that he conducted 'the search tn li i»k *<» mlu>r | n 
containers of alcohol or "other evidence," and Officer Morgan's 'mistaken belief that 
' • .-ij •- . . a isconsei i t to search the vehiUt ;>* » Aplt. at 9-10. Defendant's 
ciaun idils unae* —* "**•* s 
,ent to the Constitution, a vehicle search without 
warrant is per se unreasonable unless it is subject to an exception to the1 waruiil 
ii'i|mremi'iM I lr r" r i , i K I I 1 \ ^nw^c^n, "JHM I1" ,'d 220, lib l1 'lah i 1 
App. . 'j'Jij. wiic ol the well-estabhaiicu c* *~ to the ^ in m i i i i l 11 i t » 
warrantless searches and seizures incident to a lawful arrest." In re A . A. C , 636 P.2J 
l<> 1 - .> . , • aujonnu 145 U S. 7 5 2 ( 1 9 6 9 ) ) . " A c c o r d i n g 
to t he ru l e a l l o w i n g a s e a r r h im hli iim i i i m %fim: nll i i u > I m 
warrant, lawfully s g 'the person he or she is arresting if: (1) 'the 
arrest is lawtu. ,cc ^ * -* , Belton, 453 U.S 454,. 458, \w '\ w*\ (2) the search is 
of Thr i iv1 \\ ill mi ii 11 f i in i 11 I I I I il iii 1 1 1 mi in i . . * . c * 
"52, 763 (1969); and (3) the search is conducted contemporanooiislv in (Ir m n i -i •,/ 
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at 764." State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1117-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
(1) Defendant's arrest and search were lawful. 
A search is lawful so long as the police have probable cause to arrest or search, 
and the arrest "follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search." Spurgeon, 904 
P.2d at 227 (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980). In order to show that 
the sequence of the search and the arrest where proper in the instant case, it is first 
necessary to show that the officers had the requisite probable cause to arrest or search. Id. 
at 226-27. "'Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officers' 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been 
or is being committed.'" Id. at 226 (quoting State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 
1986)). Accordingly, a determination as to whether probable cause to arrest or search 
exists requires a "common sense assessment of the totality of the circumstances 
confronting the arresting or searching officer." Id. (citation omitted). 
The instant case presents facts and circumstances that give rise to probable cause 
to arrest. During the officers' initial approach, Officer Niesporek observed defendant 
sitting in the driver's seat of his vehicle and noticed an open container of alcohol spilled 
on the ground outside defendant's closed door. R. 126:67-69. When questioned about 
the can on the ground, defendant pointed to the can and admitted that he 4liad one can," 
and handed the officer an unopened can of beer. R. 126:69. Officer Morgan also noticed 
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another open container of alcohol hidden between the passenger seat and door of 
defer* - < .. aiven the open containers of 
J
 ' king while 'inside which his vehicle, the officers had probable cause to arvw i^ 
defendant for possession of an open container 01 iicohol inside a motor vehic k Set 
Spurgeon *)0 I P "M nt ^Cn-"1'1 See a I I huili n (authorizing a 
• e officer :.j make a ia.\ —; /.* less arrest i ommitted i 
attempted in the presence of any peace officer").6 
E * i
 tiisite probable cause to arrest i. uuu. r 
defendant's focus O i l U1V* U l l l W & l d subjective mor-"r - *"u thr* M-MIM \\ • * 
pertinent Fourth. .Amendment inquiry is not ••- . the officer subje,,*** 
ai'iubt defendant, but v\»' ' I'c ttively, he could have lawfully arrested defendant See 
State \ /•/.;>•'- ' . ; • • . ; *.u .. i i ! ^ : ^.a,... and 
holdin _. ij of an arrest must »*, 
ofliccir .uDir ;tive motivations or suspicions")- * " ^r.rvnMtt^i __^  Jtricer 
6Although a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41.-6-44.20 (2000) is a class C 
misdemeanor, it is an offense subject to incarceration for a maximum term of ninety days. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1302 (2000); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-204 (1999). 
Therefore, possession of an open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle, in vmlan 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.20 (2000), is an arrestable offense. See State v. O Br^n, ?J^ 
P.2d 647, 649-50 (Utah Ct App. 1998) (police lawfully arrested a defendant for 
possession of an open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle, in violation of Utah Code 
\ n n §4l-6-44.?onnom). 
Niesporek's testimony that at the time of the search he had not decided whether to arrest 
defendant or issue a citation, his statement that he conducted the search to look for other 
open containers of alcohol or "other evidence," and Officer Morgan's mistaken belief that 
defendant had given his consent to search the vehicle, the officers' had probable cause to 
arrest and therefore their conduct was justified as part of a lawful search incident to 
arrest. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) ("[T]he fact that the officer 
does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the 
legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as 
the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action."); accord State v. Lopez, 873 
P.2d 1127, 1137 (Utah 1994) (u[T]he Fourth Amendment simply does not require an 
officer's state of mind to perfectly correspond to his or her legally justified actions.").7 
The facts and circumstances of the instant case also support the requisite probable 
cause to search defendant's vehicle for additional open containers of alcohol. Based upon 
the open container hidden between the passenger seat and door and the discarded can 
found spilled on the ground outside defendant's door, the officers could reasonably infer 
7What is not permitted under the search incident to arrest doctrine is a situation 
where police use the evidence obtained in a search as the only probable cause to justify a 
subsequent arrest See Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 542-43 (1990) (holding a warrantless 
search that provides probable cause for an arrest can not be justified as an incident of that 
arrest). But here, although at the time of the search of defendant's vehicle Officer 
Niesporek had not decided whether to issue a citation or arrest defendant, the officer had 
the probable cause to lawfully arrest defendant for possession of an open container of 
alcohol within a motor vehicle before the search occurred. 
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that defendant may have destroyed or concealed other open containers inside the car and 
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.is an. ^oiice have probable cause to arrest and the formal arrest follow s 
i • ~ . . . . . . ..-. ~*z scorch r r e r e ^ ~~?st 
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at 1046; Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 227, "[Tlhe contempor ^ . . as requn ;, ^ ihe contest 
i I in search ol a ear incident to the arrest of its occupant, requires only a routine, 
continuou i SI"*IIIi€an<,fi1 nf n ruilK i mum Im m^ illi .IIIU | n ill I m 11ic the arrest." 
Giron, 943 P,2dat 1120, 
H n r iii I I iitwasanilltfdtodtyirifa!^^ SeeK. 
I %i\ 7T-" "in i mi III IIIIIII IIIIIIIIIII mi ; mi ij1 ; : • in: i M : i :» cling or lite e> etit muicates that the1 total time 
from'the . , v ^xw V t c s t t o the end of the vehicle search M| i linn' iniiiiili See 
Onboard Video Recording af 8 23 to ? "2 The search was conducted while defendant 
. - le scene m>^ yee Giron, 943 
P.2d at 1119-20 (''"""the i: at in aim. * ' I, |„1 „| ilie " 
place of arrest is, as a practical matter, likely to overcome any problems as to temporal 
proximity.'") (citing 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 7.1(c), at 448 (3d ed. 
1996)); State v. Smith, 813 P.2d 888 (Idaho 1991) (where the search of the car was 
conducted while the car was still at the scene of the arrest, a half-hour delay did not result 
in an invalid search incident to arrest). Additionally, the trial testimony of Officer 
Niesporek, Officer Morgan, and defendant appear to describe one continuous stream of 
events that occurred during the same period of time, beginning with the initial contact and 
ending with defendant's arrest SeeR. 126:65-74, 116-17, 143-47. Accordingly, the 
search of defendant's vehicle was incident to his arrest because the arrest "followed 
quickly on the heels of the challenged search." Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 111. 
(3) The area searched was within defendant's immediate control-
In addition to the contemporaneous requirement, the State must also demonstrate 
that the area searched was reasonably within defendant's immediate control. State v. 
Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 979 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). "Thus the reasonableness of a search 
must be determined from 'the totality of the circumstances,' with consideration given to 
the following factors: (1) whether or not the arrestee was placed in some sort of restraints; 
(2) the position of the oficer vis-a-vis the defendant in relation to the place searched; (3) 
the ease or difficulty of gaining access to the searched area or item; and (4) the number of 
officers present in relation to the number of arrestees or other persons." Id. (quotations 
and citations omitted). 
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C. Because the officers conducted a lawful search incident to arrest, the 
evidence found in defendant's vehicle was not suppressibie as fruit of 
the poisonous tree. 
Defendant also claims that the officers exceeded the scope of their search by 
looking in places were items other than open containers of alcohol could be found, Br. of 
Aplt. at 10. Therefore defendant claims that the drug paraphernalia found in his car 
should also be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Id. Because, as illustrated 
above, the officers were lawfully entitled to search defendant's vehicle incident to his 
arrest, this claim also fails. Under the search incident to arrest doctrine, police may 
search any bags and containers found within the passenger compartment, even if those 
objects are incapable of concealing evidence of the criminal conduct for which the 
suspect was arrested. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460-61, n. 4. 
POINT II 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE WAS 
EFFECTIVE IN LIGHT OF THE LAWFUL SEARCH 
INCIDENT TO DEFENDANT'S ARREST 
Defendant next claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not 
timely filing a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his vehicle 
and a motion for new trial also objecting to the use of that evidence at trial, Br. of Aplt. 
at 11. Defendant argues that his counsel should have filed a motion to suppress prior to 
trial rather than after the State rested its case at trial, or alternatively, that counsel should 
have filed a motion for new trial upon the court's invitation. Id. This claim is based upon 
the assumptions that (1) the evidence obtained by the officers from the search of 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's conviction for possession of an open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle, 
possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a controlled substance. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this I) ^ day of July, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
TREY T. COLEMERE 
Assistant Attorney General 
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RULB 24. BRIEFS 
(a) Brief of the Appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency 
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of 
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be 
set out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page 
references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with 
references to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: 
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the 
trial court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in 
the trial court. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the 
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, 
and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under 
paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review 
shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below 
shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) 
of this rule. 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, 
shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of 
the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the 
argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of 
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
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reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a 
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary 
under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless 
doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound 
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall 
contain a copy of: 
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central 
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals 
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal 
but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter 
service; and 
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to 
the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript 
of the court's oral decision, or the contract or document subject to 
construction. 
(b) Brief of the Appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not 
include: 
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is 
dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or 
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of 
the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply Brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief 
in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal . Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further 
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in Briefs to Parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs 
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the 
actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the 
injured person," "the taxpayer,"etc. 
(e) References in Briefs to the Record. References shall be made to the pages 
of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any 
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant 
to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or 
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each 
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately 
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by 
the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. 
If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
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reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was 
identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of Briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs 
shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, 
exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and 
any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record 
as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, 
paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in Cases Involving Cross-Appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the 
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the 
purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the 
court otherwise orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in 
length. The brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and 
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of 
the appellant and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall then 
file a brief which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the 
appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues 
raised in the appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not 
exceed 25 pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second 
brief, not to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the 
appellant's answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-
appellant's first brief. The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of 
table of contents, table of authorities, and addenda and may be exceeded only 
by permission of the court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good 
cause shown. 
(h) Briefs in Cases Involving Multiple Appellants or Appellees. In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for 
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and 
any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of 
another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(i) Citation of Supplemental Authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An 
original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An 
original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There 
shall be a reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued 
orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument 
state the reasons for the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made 
within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(j) Requirements and Sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from 
burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not 
in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the 
court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer. 
(k) Brief Covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and 
shall comply with Rule 27. 
[Amended effective July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998; November 1, 
1999.] 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 41. MOTOR VEHICLES 
CHAPTER 6. TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 
ARTICLE 5. DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS DRIVING 
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
Current through End of 2000 General Session 
41-6-44.20 Drinking alcoholic beverage and open containers in motor vehicle 
prohibited --Definitions --Exceptions. 
(1) A person may not drink any alcoholic beverage while operating a motor 
vehicle or while a passenger in a motor vehicle, whether the vehicle is moving, 
stopped, or parked on any highway. 
(2) A person may not keep, carry, possess, transport, or allow another to 
keep, carry, possess, or transport in the passenger compartment of a motor 
vehicle, when the vehicle is on any highway, any container which contains any 
alcoholic beverage if the container has been opened, its seal broken, or the 
contents of the container partially consumed. 
(3) In this section: 
(a) "Alcoholic beverage" has the meaning given in Section 32A-1-105. 
(b) "Chartered bus" has the meaning given in Section 32A-1-105. 
(c) "Limousine" has the meaning given in Section 32A-1-105. 
(d) "Passenger compartment" means the area of the vehicle normally occupied 
by the operator and passengers and includes areas accessible to them while 
traveling, such as a utility or glove compartment, but does not include a 
separate front or rear trunk compartment or other area of the vehicle not 
accessible to the operator or passengers while inside the vehicle. 
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to passengers in the living quarters 
of a motor home or camper. 
(5) Subsection (2) does not apply to passengers traveling in any licensed 
taxicab or bus. 
(6) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to passengers who have carried their 
own alcoholic beverage onto a limousine or chartered bus that is in compliance 
with Subsections 32A-12-213(1)(b) and (c). 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 41. MOTOR VEHICLES 
CHAPTER la. MOTOR VEHICLE ACT 
PART 13. OFFENSES AND PENALTIES 
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
Current through End of 2000 General Session 
41-la-1302 Violation --Class C misdemeanor. 
A violation of any provision of this chapter is a class C misdemeanor, unless 
otherwise provided. 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 7. ARREST, BY WHOM, AND HOW MADE 
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
Current through End of 2 000 General Session 
77-7-2 Arrest by peace officers. 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, 
without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of any 
peace officer; "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any device that 
enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or records the 
observations of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony or a class A 
misdemeanor has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the 
person arrested has committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a 
public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person may. 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another person. 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 3. PUNISHMENTS 
PART 2. SENTENCING 
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
Current through End of 2000 General Session 
76-3-204 Misdemeanor conviction --Term of imprisonment. 
A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be sentenced to 
imprisonment as follows: 
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding one year; 
(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding six 
months; 
(3) In the case of a class C misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding ninety 
days. 
